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Toward a Typology of Greek
Regulations about Religious Matters
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1 There have been several collections of what have been called Greek Sacred Laws. The first
was published by Johannes von Prott and Ludwig Ziehen in two volumes, the first in 1896,
the second in 1906.1 Franciszek Sokolowski updated and supplemented their collection in
three volumes: Lois sacrées de l’Asie Mineure (= LSAM), Lois sacrées des cités grecques (= LSCG),
and Lois sacrées des cités grecques. Supplément (= LSS).2 In these volumes the documents are
grouped  by  geographical  region.  Eran  Lupu  has  recently  published  a  useful  volume
entitled Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents, to which he gave the abbreviation
NGSL.3 Like other scholars, I am very grateful for these valuable works, which greatly
facilitate the study of Greek religion and the laws of the Greek city-states. But from a legal
point of view, these collections are rather chaotic: they combine inscriptions containing
different kinds of rules, only some of which can be called “laws” or even “sacred laws.”
Strictly speaking, a law is a rule issued by a political authority and enforced by public
officials (for discussion of the term “law” see below) and a “sacred law” should be a law
that  concerns  primarily  sacred  matters.  Let  us  take  the  twenty-seven  inscriptions
collected by Lupu.4 Three appear to be calendars (NGSL nos. 1, 3 [?], and 23), three are
dedications by individuals (NGSL nos. 4, 21, and 24), one is a set of by-laws for a private
group (eranos) (NGSL no. 5), one contains two deme decrees (NGSL no. 2), which includes
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honors for Moirocles and a lease of quarries and land of Heracles to provide revenue for
sacrifices, one is enacted by phyletai (possibly a subdivision of the state) (NGSL no. 16), and
one is a contract (NGSL no. 19).5 Four are too fragmentary to allow any firm conclusions (
NGSL nos. 6, 8, 9, 10), and in four others there is no indication which authority enacted
and enforced the rules (NGSL nos. 7, 13, 25, 27). Two are what I would call warning signs (
NGSL nos. 12 and 22). This category is discussed below.
2 The other problem with these collections is that they do not distinguish between laws
whose primary aim is to regulate or establish religious activities and those that regulate
activities  that  have  little  to  do  with  religion  but  contain  a  section  about  religious
practices. For instance, Lupu includes the famous law about the gymnasium from Beroea (
NGSL no. 14); this is a law (face A, l. 1–3, 6, 16–22), but most of its provisions consist of
rules  about  the  gymnasium.  There  is  a  section  about  an  athletic  festival  called  the
Hermaea,  but  most  of  these  rules  concern the  contests  and few are  concerned with
religious activities such as sacrifices (face B, l. 45–46, 65–67). These sacrifices form part of
the duties of the officials in charge of the gymnasium and the festival and are subordinate
to its main purpose, which is to regulate activities in the gymnasium, many of which have
nothing to do with religion. It would be a bit of a stretch to call this a sacred law. The
same is true about the law about reconciliation at Nakone (NGSL no. 26), which contains
only seven lines about sacrifices and a festival out of a total of thirty-three lines (27–33).
Only four of the inscriptions collected by Lupu (NGSL nos. 15, 17, 18, 20) contain what one
might call sacred laws stricto sensu, that is, rules about religious activities enacted by a
city-state and enforced by its officials. This is a valuable collection, but the title Greek
Sacred  Law is  a  misnomer.  One  could  make  the  same objection  about  the  important
collections of Sokolowski.
3 The aim of this essay is to make a start at bringing some order into this chaos. This essay
adumbrates  a  typology  that  will  enable  scholars  to  arrange  the  documents  in  the
collections of  Sokolowski  and Lupu (and any other documents containing regulations
about religious matters) into categories that make sense from a legal perspective. It is not
however just an exercise in pigeonholing these texts according to various legal criteria, a
task that may satisfy our desire for tidiness and order but add little to our understanding
of  Greek  religion.  As  I  hope  to  show,  the  proposed typology  also  reveals  something
important about the nature of religious authority in ancient Greece and the importance
of the rule of law in the religious sphere.
 
The features of a law
4 It is necessary to begin with the most problematic term in the title of these collections —
lex in Latin, loi in French and law in English or Gesetz in German.6 Lupu lays down only two
requirements for inclusion in his collection:  “the text must be prescriptive and their
subject matter must pertain to religion.”7 He then tries to classify them by their contents:
sacred space,  sacred officials,  performance of cult,  and religious events (festivals and
ceremonies).8 But not all texts that are prescriptive are laws; one must make distinctions
among different types of regulations and the ways in which they are enforced. What this
essay proposes is that one should classify the texts in the collections of Sokolowski and
Lupu according to the nature of the authority that issued and enforced them. We should
also make distinctions among different types of legal transactions (enactment of laws,
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appointment  of  officials,  contracts,  warning  signs,  accounts  of  officials,  dedications,
donations to public bodies and private groups, wills).
5 It is necessary to preface the discussion by listing the basic features of a law (nomos).9 In
this way, there will be a clear set of criteria that enables scholars to distinguish between
laws stricto sensu and other kinds of regulations about religious matters (such as those of
private associations) that do not qualify as laws of federal bodies or of the polis. It is best
to use a set of cross-cultural criteria that are descriptive and to avoid normative criteria
deriving from a single legal tradition.10 First, a law must be enacted and enforced by a
political authority, that is, the state.11 This political authority must be recognized by the
community and its neighbors as legitimate. One cannot have a political authority without
a community that obeys its commands. To qualify as a state, a community should have
well defined borders, a set of members (“citizens”), who enjoy rights and duties that non-
members do not possess, a distinction between officials and private citizens, and formal
procedures  for  enacting rules  about  its  members  and those  resident  in  its  territory.
Second, a law must have general application: it must apply to all members of society or to
large groups. A command issued to an individual is not a law. Here it is important to make
a distinction between laws and contracts. In contrast to a law, a contract is a promise or
exchange of promises that creates rights and duties only for the parties to the agreement.
A contract does not have general application. The rules concerning a priesthood, on the
other hand, do qualify as laws provided the priesthood has jurisdiction over a cult of the
city. For instance, an inscription from fifth century BCE Athens creates a priesthood for
the shrine of Athena Nike. As we can tell from the prescript, this is a general set of rules
passed by the Assembly and applies to any woman who becomes priestess (LSCG no. 12 =
IG I3, 36).
6 Third, a law must prescribe rights and duties. It must indicate to those subject to its
provisions what they cannot do, what they are permitted to do, and what they must do. In
the sacred laws to be examined rights are often expressed with the verb exesti with the
infinitive (“it is permitted to do something”) while duties are often expressed with third-
person imperatives or with infinitives (often dependent on the verb edoxen “it has been
decided”).  This  might  exclude calendars  from the category of  law because they only
inform the reader when an event is going to take place, but they do not order someone to
do it or provide sanctions when it is not performed. On the other hand, they implicitly
command priests to perform rituals, and priests of public cults were officials who were
subject to euthynai, that is, an audit after their term of office.12 If priests failed to perform
their religious duties, they would also be subject to punishment.13 For example, the orator
Apollodorus reports that the hierophant Archias was punished because “he had sacrificed
on the altar in the courtyard at Eleusis a victim brought by the courtesan Sinope when it
was illegal to sacrifice on that day and when not he, but the priestess had the right to
perform the sacrifice” ([Demosthenes] LIX, 116–117).14 The rules he violated may have
been set forth in a calendar listing the kinds of offerings to be made, the days of sacrifice
and who was entitled to conduct the sacrifice. Just because the vast majority of calendars
preserved on stone do not indicate penalties for infractions of their provisions, this does
not mean that no such penalties existed. In fact, we know that the Athenians considered
these calendars as part of their lawcode because they were included among the measures
included in the revision of the laws that took place between 410 and 399 BCE.15 The laws
of Draco and Solon that were revised between 410 and 399 contained many rules about
sacrifices and presumably listed them in the form of a calendar (Lysias, XXX, 17–20).16
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7 The fourth aspect of a law — a procedure for enforcement if the rule is violated — goes
closely with the fifth — a sanction for those who violate the law.17 In many laws about
religious  practices,  however,  these  two  aspects  are  combined  in  one  clause  in  the
apodosis  of  a  conditional  sentence  (what legal  historians  call  the  casuistic  form  of
statute): if someone commits a certain action or does not perform what is required, an
official is to impose a fine of a certain amount.18 In some cases, however, the law indicates
how the accuser can initiate an action in court and places the penalty in a separate clause
(LSCG no. 136, l. 29–30).19 Though one finds financial penalties at all levels of authority
(the authorities controlling Panhellenic shrines, laws of the polis, subdivisions of the polis,
private associations), the types of penalties varied from one level to another.
 
Warning signs and laws
8 Before discussing the classification of sacred regulations and orders about sacred matters
into categories,  however,  one must make a distinction between types of  inscriptions.
Parker has noted that some inscriptions forbid or prescribe a certain action but do not
indicate a penalty for those who violate the rule. Parker has called these “black-tie rules”
and  believes  that  they  are  informal  rules  enforced  by  social  custom,  not  by  legal
penalties.20 Here are some examples:






Wash the intestines outside
and clean the dung.





The boundary stone of Zeus the Highest.
It is not themis for someone uninitiated
or for a woman (to enter).
11 LSCG no. 94 (Delos) — second century BCE (IG IX 4, 1300).
ἀπ’ οἴνου μὴ προσιέναι
μηδὲ ἐν ἀνθινοῖς.
Do not enter after drinking or
in bright-coloured (lit. “flowery”) garments.
12 There  is  no reason to  think that  because  these  orders  do not  indicate  penalties,  no
penalties would be imposed were someone to violate these orders and prohibitions. We
should compare  these  documents  to  speeding signs  or  other  regulatory  signs  in  the
modern world. For instance, if you ignore a sign stating 100 kilometers per hour and
drive at 140 kilometers per hour or a sign at a crossroads ordering: “STOP”, there is a
high probability that a policeman (or policewoman) will stop you and give you a ticket
with a fine to pay. The absence of any mention of a sanction on such a sign does not mean
that there is no sanction; it is implicit in the nature of the message and does not have to
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be spelled out.21 One can often tell the difference between “signs” in the ancient Greek
world and publications of laws or the by-laws of an association in three ways. First, signs
give only succinct orders and are brief and to the point.22 They often lack enactment
formulas and orders for publication. In general, they do not indicate penalties (but see
LSCG no. 76) or which authority has the power to enforce them. Second, while laws and
by-laws are almost always published on free-standing stelai, signs are placed on altars (
LSCG nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 95 [?], 114, 131; LSS nos. 30, 55, 58, 62, 74), at the entrance to a cave
(LSCG nos. 9, 133), on a rock (LSCG no. 132; LSS no. 5), the wall of a fountain house or other
building (LSCG nos. 76, 113; LSS no. 50), the architrave of a temple (LSS no. 123), the lintel
of a building (LSS no. 49) or on horoi (boundary-markers) (LSCG no. 121; LSS no. 34; LSAM
nos. 75 and 83).23 A law is normally placed in a public space normally reserved for public
notices where everyone will read them.24 The full text of a law may be placed at the shrine
to which their provisions apply (see LSCG nos. 4; 50; 83, l. 66–69; 92, l. 41–42; 118, l. 36–41),
but this is not necessary. In the case of a law from Ialysos on Rhodes, the text is to be
published in three places (LSCG no. 136, l. 13–18). On the other hand, a sign is located in a
place where its orders are relevant and where its location makes it possible for the reader
to understand its meaning. An inscription from Cumae is very “context-sensitive” — it
forbids burial to the uninitiated “in this place” (LSS no. 120, l. 1–2 [ἐντοῦθα]. Cf. LSAM
no. 83). In the case of altars, signs often indicate what can or cannot be sacrificed; the sign
does not have to indicate where these rules apply because it is obvious that the orders
apply only to the altar on which it is inscribed.
13 The problem for the modern reader of course is that we often cannot tell which authority
issued the order or how it would be enforced because we lack the contextual information
ancient readers would have had. In the case of the instructions not to wash out intestines
and to clean out dung at the Vari cave in Attica, one can determine who probably issued
the instructions because other inscriptions state that Archedemus of Thera dedicated the
cave to the nymphs (IG I3, 977, 978, 980). This is not a law about religious matters, but a
regulation issued by the person who dedicated the shrine. But in other cases, there is no
other information that would allow us to answer this question. A contemporary however
would not have had this problem; he or she would have been able to infer who had issued
the order and who would enforce it from their knowledge of the place; they would have
known whether the altar belonged to the polis, a deme, a private association or a private
individual.25
14 Just because a prohibition is expressed with phrases such as ou themis, ou themiton, or ouch
hosion does not mean that the rule was not enforced by officials or other persons in
control of a sanctuary.26 For instance, according to Herodotus (V, 72, 3) there was a rule
prohibiting Dorians from entering the Acropolis of Athens (οὐ  γὰρ  θεμιτὸν  Δωριεῦσι
παριέναι  ἐνθαῦτα).  When King Cleomenes,  a Spartan and thus a Dorian,  went to the
Acropolis and tried to enter the adyton of the goddess during his invasion of Attica in 508
BCE,  the  priestess  of  Athena  told  him  to  leave.  Cleomenes  obviously  took  the  rule
seriously because he tried to convince the priestess that it did not apply to him, claiming
that he was not a Dorian but an Achaean.  Herodotus (VI,  81)  also relates that  when
Cleomenes tried to sacrifice on the altar at the Heraeum of Argos, the priest told him that
it was not hosion for a foreigner to sacrifice there (οὐκ ὅσιον εἶναι ξείνῳ αὐτόθι θύειν)
and tried to prevent him. In each case, there was a prohibition expressed with language
similar to that used in several of the “signs” found on altars and in shrines, and in each
case  a  priest  or  priestess  made  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  prohibition  by  stopping
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Cleomenes who was violating the prohibition. By the same token, we should expect that
whoever set up these “signs,” whether they were public officials or private individuals or
groups,  also  attempted to  enforce  their  provisions  and did  not  leave  it  up  to  social
pressure to make sure the orders were respected.
 
Levels of Authority
15 In the cases in which we do know who issued the regulations and enforced the penalties,
we should group these regulations by the authority that issued them and the legal basis of
these regulations.27 This is important because as we will see there are several levels of
authority,  each one with its  own distinct  legal  basis  and own distinctive methods of
enforcement: first, the level of federal leagues such as the Amphictyony of Delphi or the
authorities controlling other Panhellenic sanctuaries;  second, at the level of the polis;
third, at the level of the subdivisions of the polis such as tribes and demes; fourth, at the
level of private associations such as thiasoi, orgeones or other similar groups; and fifth, at
the level of the individual and his kin — these are the individual dedications providing
funds for the performance of rituals or the maintenance of a sanctuary.
 
Panhellenic Sanctuaries
16 At  the  highest  level  there  are  sacred  laws  enacted  by  the  authorities  controlling
Panhellenic sanctuaries, which apply both to individuals visiting the sanctuaries and to
entire  communities.28 The  sanctuary  of  Apollo  at  Delphi  was  controlled  by  the
Amphictyons represented by hieromnemones and pylagoroi (e.g., Aeschines, III, 115) who
were sent by the cities and groups belonging to the Amphictyony and met at Delphi and
Anthela.29 According to Aeschines (II, 115), all the members swore an oath that included
promises not to raze any city of the Amphictyons, nor exclude them from flowing water,
either in peace or in war, and to punish all those who desecrated the shrine of Apollo.30
The Amphictyons passed legislation about many different matters, mostly concerning the
administration  of  the  sanctuary.31 All  measures  voted  by  the  Amphictyons  were
immediately binding on all the member states and do not appear to have been submitted
to these states for  ratification although for important  matters  the Amphictyons first
consulted with member states before voting.32
17 A copy of an Amphictyonic law dated to before 380/79 BCE and found at Athens gives a
good idea of the council’s jurisdiction.33 The hieromnemones swear to judge cases honestly,
not to make a profit from cases, to recover any fines to the best of their ability and not to
use common funds as a personal gift (l. 3–9). The secretary is also to swear an oath (10–
13). The law sets down rules about sacrificial victims (l. 13–14), about consecrated land
(l. 15–21),  buildings  in  the  sanctuary  (l. 21–26),  prices  for  certain  items (?)  (l. 26–34),
repairs (l. 34–40), roads and bridges (l. 40–43), and the length of the sacred truce (l. 43–
49). There are several clauses giving the hieromnemones the power to impose fines (l. 18–
19, 24–25, 43) and making them subject to fines if they do not perform their duties (l. 18–
19, 37–39).
18 What makes these rules different from those of a polis is that the Amphictyons can also
punish entire cities. For instance, if a hieromnemon does not contribute to repairs, his city
can be banned from the sanctuary (l. 39–40). The same penalty is imposed on those poleis
that do not accept the sacred truce (l. 47–48).34 One penalty clause appears to call for the
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Amphictyons to make war on a polis that violates rules about consecrated land (l. 19–21).
They also legislated about land for pasture set aside for sacred herds (LSCG no. 79 = CID IV,
108),  possibly  about  port-taxes  for  those  visiting  the  sanctuary  (CID IV,  2),  the
appointment of treasurers (CID IV, 9), the safety of those visiting the shrine (CID IV, 51),
payments for construction (CID IV, 57), and the supervision of sacred buildings such as
the stoa of Attalus (LSS no. 43 = CID IV, 85).35
19 The Amphictyons might guarantee the security of festivals at sanctuaries belonging to
their members.36 For instance, an inscription found at Acraiphia in Boeotia grants asylia
during the sacred truce for the Ptoia at the shrine of Apollo Ptoios (LSCG no. 73). Those
who violate the truce are subject to a fine of 2,000 staters and the amount of the damage
done, which is to be the sacred property of the shrine (face A, l. 4–5, 21–24). To inform all
cities, the Amphictyons send copies of their dogma to the cities and ethne (l. 24–26). In this
case, the jurisdiction of the Amphicytons extends beyond the boundaries of the polis.
20 The Amphictyons clearly took the rules about the cultivation of consecrated land very
seriously. There was an Amphictyonic law that the plain of Cirrha beneath the sanctuary
should remain uncultivated (Aeschines, III, 107–108). This law was passed in response to
an oracle of Apollo before the First Sacred War.  Scholars are divided on the issue of
whether this war actually took place, but there is no need to doubt that the law existed in
340,37 and the Amphictyonic law from Athens certainly would appear to confirm this (see
above). At a meeting of the Amphictyons in 340/39 BCE Aeschines, serving as pylagoros for
Athens, charged that the Amphissans were cultivating sacred land (Aeschines, III, 118–
121). There was heated discussion, and later the herald summoned all the hieromnemones
and pylagoroi to meet in the morning and threatened those who did not appear with
exclusion from the sanctuary (Aeschines, III, 122). The next day, they went to the plain,
sacked the harbor, and burned down houses. On their way back, they were attacked by
the Locrians of Amphissa, who sent them scurrying for safety (Aeschines, III, 123). The
following  day  a  meeting  was  held  presided  over  by  Cottyphus  of  Thessaly.  The
Amphictyons  voted  that  the  hieromnemones gather  for  an  emergency  meeting  at
Thermopylae and bring resolutions about punishing the Amphissans (Aeschines, III, 124).
The Amphictyons elected Cottyphus of Pharsalus to lead an expedition against Amphissa,
which expelled those responsible for the sacrilege, restored others, and imposed a fine
(Aeschines, III, 128–129). When the Amphissans did not pay the fine, the Amphictyons
elected Philip of Macedon to lead another expedition (Aeschines, III, 129).
21 The  Amphictyons  also  passed  sentence  in  346  BCE  on  the  entire  community  of  the
Phocians for the sacrileges committed during the Third Sacred War. After their leader
Phalaecus fled with his soldiers into exile, and the Phocians surrendered to a coalition of
Greeks headed by Philip II, the Amphictyons voted to destroy the walls of cities in Phocis,
to exclude the Phocians from the sanctuary and the council, to forbid the Phocians from
possessing horses and arms, to declare those Phocians who had fled polluted and subject
to arrest, to destroy the cities of Phocis, to impose an indemnity of sixty talents, to throw
the arms of the Phocians and their mercenaries into a ravine, to sell their horses, and to
take measures to protect the oracle and peace and harmony among the Greeks (Diodorus
Siculus,  XVI,  60,  1–3).38 The Amphictyons  clearly  did not  consider  their  laws against
cultivating sacred territory and the theft of sacred funds a set of “black-tie rules.”
22 Space does not allow for a discussion of the administration of the Panhellenic shrine at
Olympia.  It  should be noted however that  the authorities  there also had rules about
excluding entire communities that violated their sacred truce.39 According to Thucydides
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(V, 49, 1), the Spartans were excluded from the shrine at Olympia by the people of Elis
with the result that they did not sacrifice or compete at the festival of 420 BCE because
the people of Elis claimed that they had attacked Phyrkos and invaded Lepreum after
they had received the truce for the festival at Olympia.40 To get around this ban, the
Spartan Lichas entered a chariot in the name of the Boeotian state, but when his chariot
won, and he tried to tie a headband around the head of the charioteer to show that the
chariot belonged to him, the rabdouchoi (“rod-bearers”) beat him because he was violating
the  ban  on  his  community  (Thucydides,  V,  50,  4.  Cf.  Xenophon,  Hellenika  III,  2,  21;
Pausanias,  V,  2,  2).  The  Athenians  also  had  rules  about  the  sacred  truce  for  the
Panhellenic mysteries of Demeter and Kore (LSS no. 3) and expected them to be respected.
When the people of Trichonium arrested the spondophoroi who announced the truce in
367/6, the Athenians sent an embassy to protest their violation of the “common laws of
the Greeks” (παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων) (SEG 32, 57).41
23 City-states might also appeal to the authority of the oracle at Delphi to confer authority
on  their  legislation.  For  instance,  a  city-state  might  ask  for  Apollo’s  blessing  when
establishing a colony (e.g., Herodotus, IV, 150, 3).42 Or they might request approval for a
change in the constitution as the Athenians did when they created the ten eponymous
heroes  in  508  BCE  ([Aristotle],  Athenaion  Politeia,  21, 6).  Xenophon  (Respublica
Lacedaemoniorum, 8, 5) reports that Lycurgus asked for approval from the oracle of Apollo
for the laws of Sparta.43 In several sacred laws of the polis a proposer might invoke the
authority of an oracle of Apollo in support of a motion submitted to the Assembly. For
instance, in the law about first-fruits for the sanctuary at Eleusis, the committee cites the
oracle at Delphi in support of their proposals about the shrine (LSCG no. 5, l. 5, 26, 34). 44
Another oracle of Apollo is cited in a fourth-century law about the truce for the Mysteries
(LSS no. 12,  l. 10).  When  the  Assembly  debated  whether  to  leave  the  Sacred  Orgas
uncultivated or not, the Athenians voted to consult the oracle at Delphi (LSCG no. 32,
l. 42–49).45 A genos such as the Praxiergidae at Athens could also use the oracle at Delphi
in support of their right to play a special role in the rites for the public cult of Athena
Polias (LSCG no. 15, l. 3–4, 10–12). At Anaphe in the second century BCE a citizen named
Timotheus asked the Council and Assembly to give him a place to build a temple of
Aphrodite in the shrine of Apollo and in support of his request presented an oracle of
Apollo in response to his  question about the shrine (LSCG no. 129).  When the city of
Tanagra  decided  to  move  the  sanctuary  of  Demeter  to  the  city,  they  did  so  after
consulting the oracle of Apollo (LSCG no. 72, l. 6–8).
24 On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Amphictyons ever intervened in the
internal  affairs  of  a  city-state.  One  must  therefore  draw  a  distinction  between  the
legislation of the Amphictyons (which concerned primarily matters concerning Apollo’s
sanctuary) and answers given by the oracle to individuals and communities about their
own affairs, between the Amphictyons as an international organization and the oracle as
a source of religious authority, which could be invoked by individuals and groups in the
Assembly of a polis. To use Roman terms, the Amphictyony had potestas when it came to
policing the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi and activities related to the sanctuary and its
festivals; the oracle of Apollo, on the other hand, had only auctoritas when it came to
influencing decisions made in the Council and Assembly of the polis.
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Regulations of the Polis about Religious Matters
25 The next category contains sacred regulations issued by the polis. It is best to start with
an inscription from Ialysos on Rhodes dated to around 300 BCE (LSCG no. 136 = Syll.3, 338).
46 First, it has been enacted by a political community, the people of Ialysos and public
officials  called  the  mastroi (l. 1)  and  contains  the  name  of  the  proposer  (l. 2).  The
document states the aim of the measure: to ensure the sanctity of the shrine and the
precinct kata ta patria, a phrase to be discussed in the conclusion (l. 3–5). The measure
orders public officials called the Sacred Treasurers to make three stelai and to write “this
psephisma” on them (l. 5–9), what is not “righteous” (hosion) to bring into the sanctuary of
Alectrone (l. 9–12) and what are the penalties for violators (l. 12–13) and to put each stele
in a different place (l. 13–18).  The actual regulations, which are called a nomos (l. 19),
prohibit horses,  donkeys, mules,  an animal called a ginos and any other pack-animals
from entering the sanctuary (l. 21–25) and the wearing of shoes or anything made of pig-
skin (l. 25–27).47 If anyone violates any of these rules, he is to purify the shrine and to
offer a sacrifice (l. 27–29) or be subject to a legal charge of impiety (l. 29–30: ἔνοχος ἔστω
τᾶι ἀσεβείαι). If someone brings in animals, there is a fine of one obol for each animal
(l. 30–33).48 Anyone who wishes should report violators to the mastroi (l. 33–35).
26 This text clearly qualifies as a law of the polis about religious matters. The regulations are
issued by a political authority (the people of Ialysos), and the mastroi, public officials, are
responsible for enforcing the regulations (l. 33–35). The rules apply generally (l. 23–25:
“let no one…”; l. 27–28:  “if  anyone does anything in violation of the law”).  There is a
procedure for enforcement (a legal charge of impiety and a summary fine by the mastroi).
Many other texts in the three volumes of Sokolowski clearly meet these criteria. But one
must make a distinction between the statute enacted by the polis and the religious norms
enforced by the polis. In this and other cases, the polis did not create the norms about
temples being kept pure, which were traditional (l. 5: ta patria) and existed before the
Assembly enacted this statute.  On the contrary, it  took a religious norm that already
existed and created procedures for enforcing it.49 We will  return to this point in the
conclusion.
27 The inscription from Ialysos is relatively straightforward, but matters get complicated
when we look at other regulations issued by the Greek poleis. A good example is the well-
known decree about the foundation of Brea in Northern Greece dated to around 435 BCE (
IG I3, 46).50 The top part of the inscription is missing, but it is clearly a decree of Athens
because it concerns Brea’s foundation by the Athenians and mentions public officials. The
first  seven  lines  are  fragmentary  but  appear  to  concern  legal  procedures.  The  next
section  orders  the  oikistes  to  obtain  good  omens  (καλλ]ιερ F065σαι)  (l. 8–10),  a  religious
practice. The third section orders the election of ten men to divide the land, one from
each tribe (l. 10–12), a secular activity. The fourth section gives Democleides full powers
to make decisions about the settlement (l. 12–13). The fifth and sixth sections return to
religious matters and concern sanctuaries (l. 13–15) and offerings to the Panathenaea and
Dionysia (l. 15–17).  The next five sections return to secular matters:  provisions about
attacks (l. 17–21), for publication (l. 21–24), an entrenchment clause (l. 24–30), and finally
a rider stipulating that only those from the bottom two property classes be sent to the
settlement (l. 34–46). In the entrenchment clause, one-tenth of the penalty is to be paid to
Athena, but otherwise the last five clauses do not concern religious matters. One cannot
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separate religious from secular in this inscription; the two are tightly bound together. In
this sense, this decree resembles the law about the gymnasium from Beroea (NGSL no. 14)
and the law about reconciliation at Nakone (NGSL no. 26), which contain some clauses
about religious matters but mostly pertain to non-religious business.
28 What are we to do with such a decree? We cannot call it a sacred law in the same way we
can call the decree from Ialysos a law about religious matters because it contains secular
elements. Its main aim, which is to found a new settlement, is not exclusively or even
primarily religious. But are we to exclude it from any collection of sacred laws? Or are we
to extract the religious clauses and to delete the non-religious clauses?51 Yet the religious
clauses can only be understood in the context of the rest of the decree. Obviously one
could not include all such regulations in a collection of sacred laws because it would swell
the  number  of  documents  to  unmanageable  proportions.52 My  suggestion  is  that  we
create another category in the typology of regulations about religious matters that would
include laws and decrees of the polis whose main aim is non-religious but contain orders
about religious matters. Even though one could not include all these in a collection of
documents, the inclusion of such a category in a typology would reflect an important
aspect of life in the polis, namely, that legal, political, and religious matters were often
closely intertwined. This is also true for the duties of many officials at Athens, who were
responsible  for  both  religious  and  non-religious  business.53 We  find  the  same  close
connection  of  legal  procedures  and  religious  practices  in  pollution  for  homicide  in
Athenian law and in the rules about supplication both at Athens and in other Greek poleis.
54
29 It is also important to make a distinction between general rules about religious matters
and orders of the Council or Assembly. Many measures enacted by the authority of the
polis establish festivals or broad rules about sanctuaries that are intended to apply far
into the future. For instance, a law dated to the fourth century BCE from Eretria enacts a
set of permanent rules about the Artemisia (LSCG no. 92). A law from Ceos dated to the
fifth century BCE sets forth rules to be observed for all  funerals (LSCG no. 97).  Other
measures make specific orders that apply only to the immediate future and are limited in
their application. For instance, in a decree dated to 221/20 BCE, the Athenian Assembly
orders a commission to melt  down silver dedications and to make an oenochoe (LSCG
no. 41). Another decree from Athens, this one dated to 52/51 BCE, orders the priest of
Asclepius to carry out repairs in a sanctuary (LSCG no. 44). A decree from Halasarna on
Cos dated to 21 BCE calls for a new list of priests to be inscribed (LSCG no. 174). Only the
former qualify as sacred laws of the polis in the full sense of the term.
30 What is striking is that one finds the same political and legal concerns in the sacred laws
enacted by the polis as one finds in other laws of the polis. As early as the Archaic period,
laws in many Greek poleis aimed at restricting the powers of officials and preventing the
accumulation of power in the hands of a few.55 This was done in several ways: 1) clearly
delineating  the  jurisdiction  of  officials  and  distributing  powers  to  different  officials,
2) limiting terms of  office to one year,  3) imposing penalties for officials  who do not
follow the law, 4) assigning functions to a board a officials, not one person, and 5) using
entrenchment clauses to ensure permanence and stability. One finds precisely the same
concerns in many of the sacred laws of the Greek poleis.  First, the sacred laws aim to
specify the jurisdiction and to limit the powers of religious officials. For instance, the
earliest  law  from  Athens  about  religious  matters  is  a  law  about  the  powers  of  the
Treasurers and the prytanis on the Acropolis to impose fines for specific actions and limits
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the amount of the fines (LSCG no. 3, l. 6–8, 11–13, 15–16, 22–23). A law about a festival in
honor of  Hephaestus and Athena at  Athens limits the amount that the hieropoioi can
impose as fines and requires that for larger amounts they bring a case in court (LSCG
no. 13, l. 26–30).56 The decree proposed by Callias in the late fifth century BCE creating
treasurers  for  the  Other  Gods  goes  into  obsessive  detail  about  their  duties  and
responsibilities  (IG I 3, 52 with HARRIS [2013],  p. 171–172). 57 Regulations about religious
matters from other poleis often specify the duties and limit the amount of fines to be
imposed by religious officials. The law from Andania assigns the duties of supervising the
Mysteries to several different officials,  carefully defines their duties and specifies the
amounts of  fines (LSCG no. 65.  For fines see l. 9,  77,  106,  111,  162–163).58 As  a  result,
religious officials do not act on their own discretion or their own views about what is
appropriate behavior. They are to act in accordance with the laws of the polis like other
officials (LSCG no. 69, l. 6–8; no. 92, l. 30–31). From a legal point of view, they are just as
accountable to the polis as other public officials.59 Their religious function does not give
them a privileged position vis-à-vis the Assembly and the courts. Second, the sacred laws
set forth penalties for religious officials who do not perform their duties. For instance, in
a law from Eretria dated to the fourth or third century BCE the hieropoioi who do not
perform their duties according to the written rules are to pay a fine of five hundred
drachmas each (LSCG no. 93,  l. 29–32).  In a law dated to the fourth century BCE from
Thasos the agoranomos and the priest of Asclepius are threatened with a fine if they do not
keep the shrine of Heracles clean (LSCG no. 115, l. 6–10).60 Third, the polis does not leave
the policing of public officials to social pressure or to the gods, but assigns other officials
to keep watch on their activities and to make them accountable just like all officials of the
polis. At Athens the Council supervised many officials responsible for religious matters.61
Fourth, the sacred laws show a concern for consistency and stability. Just as politicians
often justified their policies by appeals to the patrios  politeia,  the people who drafted
sacred laws invoked ta patria as the sources of authority for their proposals. To ensure
stability, entrenchment clauses in some cases were added to decrees to prevent them
from being overturned.62 Fifth, religious officials are often limited to one-year terms of
office by appointment or election.63 Sixth, to prevent the accumulation of power in the
hands of one person, religious duties are often assigned to boards of religious officials.64
Several such boards are attested at Athens in general and for Eleusis in particular.65 For
the mysteries at Andania there were several boards: the Sacred Men, the Sacred Women,
the Ten and the Five, the rhabdophoroi.66 Similar boards of religious officials are attested
in other Greek poleis.67 Seventh, to encourage average citizens to help officials enforce the
law, there are often procedures encouraging “anyone who wishes” to report violations,
sometimes with the promise of financial rewards.68 Relations between the community and
the  gods  were  too  important  and  required  detailed  regulations.  Religion  was  also  a
potential source of power, and, as with all sources of power in the Greek polis, those who
had responsibility for religious practices affecting the common good had to be closely
monitored, and their powers carefully circumscribed.
31 The  demes  of  Attica  had  their  own  religious  calendars  (LSCG no. 18  [Erchia];  no. 20
[Marathonian  Tetrapolis];  SEG  21,  542  [Teithras]),  appointed  demarchs  who  had
responsibility  for  religious  matters  among  other  duties,  and  appointed  their  own
religious officials.69 The demes owned land that they might rent out to provide funds for
religious  activities  (IG I 3,  258,  l. 25–37;  Demosthenes,  LVII,  63–64).70 As  Parker  has
observed, “the religious life of a deme can be seen as that of a mini polis, comparable on a
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small scale to that of Athens itself.”71 And like the polis the assemblies of the demes had
the power to enact  regulations about  local  cults  (LSCG no. 10;  no. 38). 72 There is  also
evidence for sacred regulations by demes and other sub-divisions of the polis such as
phylai outside Athens, especially on Cos (e.g. LSCG no. 169).73 Though in a way contained




32 Like the polis the private associations enacted regulations about sacred matters, assigned
penalties for violations and appointed officials to enforce these regulations and collect
fines.74 These associations clearly did not consider their regulations “black-tie rules.” But
the legal basis for these regulations differed from that of the sacred laws of the polis. The
polis consisted of citizens who were members of the polis through birth or, in exceptional
circumstances,  by a  decree of  the Assembly and appointed officials  who followed its
regulations and had the legitimate force to enforce these regulations.75 The association,
on the other hand, is created by the contract of koinonia among its members.76 Whether or
not the law of Solon about associations is genuine, there was a law at Athens that made all
agreements made willingly among members of a group binding on each member.77 The
sacred laws of the Greek polis were grounded in the political authority of the polis; the
regulations of associations were based on contract.78 The political authority of the polis
granted it the power to imprison, exile, and even execute those residing in Attica; the
contractual nature of the association gave its members only contractual remedies against
those who did not abide by their agreements; they could impose fines and exclude from
membership those who did not abide by their rules.79 Unlike the case at Rome in the late
Republic, however, it does not appear that the members of a group of citizens had to
obtain permission from the polis to establish a formal association. But they might depend
on the courts of the polis to enforce their rules or to resolve their disputes with other
associations. In some cases, however, like the followers of Bendis (LSCG no. 46, l. 4–9; LSS
no. 6), the Praxiergidae (LSCG no. 15), or the Eteobutadae (Aeschines, II, 147), these groups
may  have  a  special  relationship  with  the  polis,  but  these  appear  to  have  been  the
exception.
 
Donations by Individuals to Public Bodies or to Private Associations
33 In  1914  Laum  published  a  work  of  two  volumes  about  what  he  called  “Stiftungen”
(“foundations”). This term has been criticized with good reason, but it still persists in
modern scholarship, and no attempt has been made to replace it.80 In English the term
“foundation” according to the Oxford English Dictionary means in the juridical sense: “the
establishing of an institution, together with an endowment or provision for its perpetual
maintenance.”81 The first  problem is  that none of  the transactions normally grouped
under this rubric creates an institution in the legal sense of the term, that is, an entity
that possesses legal personality. This kind of legal act was impossible in the ancient Greek
world because the laws of the Greeks states did not grant legal personality to groups or
abstract entities. For this reason, there is no ancient Greek equivalent for the modern
legal term “foundation.” On the other hand, some of these documents do record the
“founding” of a cult or other religious activity, but one should not confuse this religious
sense of “foundation” (creating a religious practice) with the legal meaning of the term.
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Second, as we will see, the transactions often called “foundations” include very different
types of legal transactions. Some concern donations to the polis; other concern donations
to private groups or to families. Third, when analyzing these documents, we should pay
careful  attention to  the terms used by those who composed the documents  and the
meanings of these terms. As will become obvious, there is no need to import a modern
term, which is anachronistic, into our analysis of these documents. The terms the Greeks
themselves used allow us to understand what they were doing (or intended to do).
34 We should start with donations given to the polis and begin with a simple example: the
donation of Alcesippus of Calydon (LSCG no. 81; Syll.3, 631). The inscription states that
Alcesippus of Calydon has dedicated to the god and to the city of Delphi one hundred and
thirty gold staters, twenty-two mnai and thirty silver staters. There follows a clause “if
anything should happen to him” which is a euphemistic way of saying “if he dies” (l. 3. Cf.
l. 11).82 This  implies  that  the  dedication  of  the  money  formed  part  of  his  will.  This
inference is confirmed by a clause further down in the document, which mentions the
money he bequeaths (καταλιμπάνει) to Damasippus, Theudippa, Agias, and Pisalaus, all of
whom are instructed to carry out his funeral, the standard duty of heirs to an estate.83
Theudippa  is  his  slave,  but  the  others  must  be  his  heirs.  As  in  several  wills  of  the
philosophers and other private donations, the testator frees his slave, but also dedicates
her to the god. Like a will, the document lists witnesses at the end (l. 13–16).84
35 The text follows with a clause laying down the conditions of his “dedication” — the polis
of Delphi is to perform a sacrifice and damothoinian to Pythian Apollo every year, which is
to be called the Alcesippeia, in honor of the donor. Sacrifices are also to be made to Hera
and a procession is to be led from the grove by the priests of Apollo, the archon, the
prytaneis and the people of Delphi. The document instructs public officials to inscribe the
terms of the donation on the wall of the temple (l. 8–9). None of these rules, which are
binding on the temple and on the community, could have been laid down by Alcesippus
himself. He has obviously offered to give the money, but has also requested that certain
conditions be followed. But he could not impose his will on these authorities without
their consent. And he could not create a new religious ceremony for the city without a
public decree. This brings us to the phrase “let the dedication be valid” (l. 9: ἀνάθεσις
κυρία ἔστω).85 What this should mean is that the city decided to accept the dedication on
the terms that Alcesippus requested and held a vote after a formal proposal was made to
the  Assembly.  A  law about  dedications  from Rhodes  dated to  the  third  century BCE
illustrates the process (LSS no. 107). This law forbids anyone to place dedications in the
lower part of the sanctuary (l. 10–18). If anyone makes a request (αἰτήσηται) to place a
dedication in this place (l. 18–19), the request will be “invalid” (l. 19–20: ἄκυρος ἔστω […]
ἁ αἴτησις), and if someone does place a dedication in this place, the astynomoi will move it
to another place (l. 20–22).86 This implies that a request to dedicate that was made in
accordance with the laws would be ruled “valid.” We find a similar rule in a decree of the
Council at Athens about the shrine of Isis, which requires that those wishing to dedicate
seek permission (αἰτήσασθαι) from the Council (LSCG no. 50, face A, l. 12–14).
36 From a legal point of view, we have two separate transactions. First, there is the request
of the private individual to dedicate money to the polis and to the temple of Apollo and to
have the polis and sanctuary use the money for certain purposes. This transaction falls
under the general  religious category of  “dedication to a shrine” and under the legal
category of “gift.” It is unilateral. But this kind of dedication or gift is different from the
standard form of dedication insofar as the dedicant asks for certain conditions to be
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observed by the authority receiving the gift.  This donation is similar in a way to the
epidosis, which is also a gift by a private individual for a public purpose such as building a
temple. In the case of the epidosis, however, the initiative comes from the community,
which invites private individuals to make contributions to be paid into a fund for some
public project, and there are donations from many persons, not just a single individual.87
Second, there is the decision of the polis to accept not only the money but also the terms
requested by the dedicator.88 This takes the form of a public act (called a nomos or a
psephisma)  as  we  will  see  from other  documents.  For  this  reason I  would  place  this
document  in  the  category  of  “law (polis)  about  religious  matters”  but  create  a  sub-
category within that general rubric. This inscription found on the wall of the temple is a
hybrid because it combines elements from two types of legal transaction, the will and the
rules enacted by the polis.89
37 We  see  the  same  combination  of  dedication  and  public  decree  in  a  document  from
Calauria dated to the third century BCE (LSCG no. 59 = Syll.3, 993). Agasicles and Nicagora
dedicated to Poseidon money and a field (l. 2–4). The polis enacts rules (l. 1–2) to appoint
epimeletai who will lend the money to those providing real security or personal security
(l. 5–8) and rent out the land (l. 8–11). This money will provide funds for sacrifices to
Poseidon and Zeus Soter at an altar before their statutes next to the bouleuterion (l. 11–14).
The epimeletai will present their accounts to the euthynoi (l. 17–21).90
38 A more elaborate version of this kind of dedication accepted by the polis is found in the
donation made by Attalus II  in the year 160/59 BCE (Syll.3,  672).91 This document is a
public measure enacted by the city of Delphi.  It  starts with a long clause stating the
grounds  for  the  public  decision to  accept  the  dedication on the  terms requested by
Attalus. The city sent two sets of envoys to the king requesting money for the education
of children. The king responded by sending two amounts, 18,000 Alexander drachmas of
silver  for  education  and  3,000  for  honors  and  sacrifices.  The  city  has  responded  by
accepting the terms set down by Attalus and dedicating the money to the god. To ensure
that the money is used in the desired manner, the polis appends a long entrenchment
clause with penalties for those who divert the money to other purposes.92 The city then
establishes public officials to lend the money and to collect the interest. The language of
the measure contains many of the standard features seen in the decrees of the Greek polis.
There is no “foundation” created in the legal sense even though the money has helped to
“found” a religious festival.  The money is added to the funds controlled by the polis,
which enacts special rules to see that the money is kept as a separate fund and used for
loans with the interest from the loans used to pay for education and for sacrifices. In this
respect, it is no different from other public funds earmarked for special purposes.
39 Even though the mechanisms for carrying out the wishes of the donor are more elaborate
in this case, it is from a legal perspective no different from the dedication of Alcesippus.93
Like Alcesippus, Attalus has offered to give money for a certain purpose. Unlike the offer
of Alcesippus, however, the donation of Attalus does not form part of his will and is given
during his lifetime. Like Alcesippus, Attalus is also a bit vain and wants a new religious
ceremony named after him. As with the offer of Alcesippus, the offer of Attalus must be
ratified  by  the  polis,  which  assigns  certain  officials  to  carry  out  the  conditions
accompanying the donation. The law enacted by the Assembly on Amorgos takes the
same form: Hegesarete gives money for the Metroa. The city votes to accept the donation
and sets up procedures to lend the money and use the interest to provide funds for the
Metroa. But Hegesarete is not as vain as the two men giving money to Delphi: she does
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not expect the city to rename the festival after her. She is more modest and content with
a crown and public announcements of her generosity (LSCG no. 103, face B, l. 25–33).
40 These  donations  to  public  bodies  should  be  distinguished  from donations  to  private
bodies.94 Once more we start with a simple document before looking at more complex
ones. This is the will of a certain Pythion found at Isthmos on Cos and dated to the second
century BCE (LSCG no. 171;  SEG 14,  529).  In  l. 12–13 we find the  technical  legal  term
καταλείπει  “he  bequeaths,”  which  is  found  in  wills  and  used  to  describe  the  act  of
testation (e.g., Demosthenes, XXVII, 9–12). The document contains the wishes of Pythion
and a priestess:  the relationship between the two is not clear,  but the fact that they
appear to bequeath the property jointly suggests that they are husband and wife.95 As is
normal in a will, Pythion leaves the shrine he dedicates to his sons, but stipulates that
they hold the property in common (l. 15–16).  Like Alcesippus,  he also frees his  slave
Macarinus in his will but dedicates him to the temple so that he will take care of the
shrine, look after those who sacrifice and carry out all the terms of the will contained in a
tablet deposited in the shrine (l. 4–12). Pythion’s right to make these conditions inheres
in his rights of ownership, among which is the right of transmissibility, that is, the right
to pass on his property to his descendants.
41 This document bears some similarity to that of Alcesippus. First, both men donate money
as part of their will. Second, each man lays down conditions for the use of his property in
his will. Third, both men free a slave as part of their will. But there the similarities end.
Alcesippus donates his money to the community, which must vote to accept its conditions
and pass regulations to ensure the proper use of his money. Pythion bequeaths his money
to his descendants, who are bound by the terms of his will. From a religious point of view,
the two actions are both dedications. From a legal point of view, they are very different.
42 Limitations of space do not allow a detailed discussion of other wills that give money for
religious activities, but a few observations can be made. The will of Epicteta (IG XII 3, 330;
LSCG no. 135 [extract]) is similar to that of Pythion insofar as it passes on money and
property to  descendants,  but  the arrangements  are more complex because she gives
money to the association and property to her daughter (l. 25–41). Instead of making her
land the common property of her heirs, she forbids alienation of the Mouseion and the
temenos of heroes (l. 41–48). After the will there follows an elaborate set of rules about the
association and its officers.  In terms of classification,  the first  part of  this document
belongs to the legal category of will (l. 1–108), the second, by-laws of a private association
(l. 109–288). The document about Poseidonius’ property is slightly different (LSAM no. 72 =
Syll.3, 1044).96 It starts with an oracle of Apollo about propitiating Paternal Zeus, Apollo of
Telmessos, the Fates, the Mother of the Gods, and the agathos daimon of Poseidonius and
Gorgis (l. 1–11). This provides the religious authority for what follows. The next section
gives the terms of Poseidonius’ will relevant to the family association that will carry out
the regulations contained in the following part (l. 12–22). It is unlikely that this section
contains all the terms of his will, which must have been more extensive because it does
not mention any money or a residence. Poseidonius has pledged (ὑπέθηκεν) a field in
Astypalaea and a courtyard there as well as a garden and land surrounding a tomb with
half  the  rights  of  cultivation at  Taramptos.  He  also  stipulates  that  the  eldest  of  his
descendants serve as priest and give over four gold pieces a year (l. 18–22).97 This action is
unilateral and is based on his rights of ownership. The following section starts with an
enactment formula (l. 22: ἔδοξε) and is different from a legal perspective. This section
contains the by-laws of the association to be formed and is based on the consent of all the
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members. It resembles the second part of the document about Epicteta’s will (l. 109–288).
Even though the document about Diomedon’s dedication does not contain the language
associated with a will, it is similar to these three insofar as Diomedon dedicates a temenos
to a  god,  guest-houses,  dwellings and a slave and his  offspring (LSCG no. 177,  l. 1–6).
Diomedon also creates (one might says “founds”) an association to use these buildings
and to carry out sacrifices and forbids the association to alienate the property or pledge it
as security  (l. 43–47).  The  property  belongs  to  all  those  in  the  association,  but  his
descendants are the only ones who can serve as epimenioi (l. 144–146). These documents
are hybrids, but they should be placed under documents about private associations and
dissociated from documents recording donations to the polis. It is time to stop using the
term “foundation,” which is both misleading and anachronistic.
 
Ta Patria and Religious Authority in Ancient Greece
43 The religious practices of the Greeks were not regulated by one code of laws like Canon
Law in the Catholic Church or the laws of the Orthodox Church under the Byzantine
Empire. Canon Law is the law of a single organization that has a corporate existence. As
we have seen, Greek religious practices were not the business of a single organization
that had such a legal personality.  In the Classical  and Hellenistic periods,  the Greeks
never convened a meeting like the First  Council  of  Nicaea in 325 CE,  which issued a
uniform creed. On the contrary, these practices took place in several different contexts
and  on  several  different  levels:  at  the  level  of  federations  controlling  Panhellenic
sanctuaries, the level of cults of the polis, the level of subdivisions of the polis, on the level
of private associations,  and on the level of families.  From a modern perspective,  this
range of different authorities in religious matters appears bewildering. But a Greek in the
ancient world could worship in the shrines and participate in the rituals of Panhellenic
sanctuaries,  his own community,  several different private groups and set up his own
shrine without fear of being accused of inconsistency. In one context, a Greek followed
one body of law; in another context, he followed a similar, but never identical body of
law.
44 One must, on the other hand, not exaggerate the diversity of Greek religion. In a famous
passage, Herodotus (VIII, 144) says that the Greeks shared certain religious beliefs and
practices.  These ancestral  norms enabled the Greeks to differentiate themselves from
Egyptians, Persians and others whose practices regarding sacrifice and burial were very
different from their own as Herodotus repeatedly points out. Because all Greeks knew
what ta patria were, there was no need to define certain key terms such as thyein and
thysia,  sponde and  spondein,  pompe and  pompeuein, horkos,  ara,  ekphora,  kathairo and
katharmos in Greek sacred regulations.98 These regulations often specify who can conduct
or participate in a thusia or a pompe, who receives special portions of meat at a thysia, in
what circumstances a katharmos must be performed, and how the expenses for a sacrifice
or a festival will be paid. But this uniformity was a matter of culture and ethnicity, not
the product of legal uniformity imposed by a single organization, or, one might add, a
polis playing the role of a church.
45 Greek sacred regulations invoke ta patria at all levels: the Amphictyons of Delphi (Syll.3, 
613, face A, l. 10–11), the Assembly of the polis (IG II3, 78, l. 4–7, 10–12, 24–26; 896, l. 11;
956,  l. 5–6),  the  demes  of  Attica  (SEG  42,  112,  l. 1–6;  IG II 2,  1177,  l. 11–12),  private
associations (IG II2, 1277, l. 7–8; 1326, l. 14–15; SEG 21, 527, l. 79–80), and the founder of a
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family cult (LSCG no. 177, l. 39–44, 93–94) all claim to follow ta patria. Private groups and
individuals do not have to go through the polis to provide religious authority for their
sacred  activities.99 All  levels  had access  to  ta  patria,  even if  they  sometimes  rely  on
Panhellenic shrines or local exegetes for guidance. Ta patria were, or were believed to be,
older than the polis. The polis did not create them, did not have exclusive access to them,
and  was  subject  to  them.  This  is  the  message  of  Sophocles’  Antigone,  and  of  every
inscription that reports that men must honor the gods according to ta patria.100
46 To illustrate how the polis implemented ta patria, let us take the example of supplication.
Supplication is well attested in the Homeric poems, which reflect the social practices of
Greek society around 700 BCE.  It  consists  of  four basic  steps:  1) the approach of  the
suppliant (either to an individual or a shrine), 2) a supplicatory gesture (holding a bough,
touching the  knees,  sitting  at  an altar),  3) a  request  for  something from the  person
supplicated (supplicandus), and 4) a decision by the supplicandus either to accept or reject
the suppliant. If the supplicandus promised to grant the suppliant’s request, his promise
was  enforced  by  Zeus  Hikesios,  Zeus  the  god  of  suppliants.  The  evaluation  of  the
suppliant’s request was made following standard moral and religious views that are in
accordance with the unwritten laws of the gods.101 The polis took over this practice and
subjected it to public regulation: suppliants making public requests came to a designated
public altar;  the request was submitted to the Council  and Assembly (IG II2,  218;  337;
Demosthenes, XXIV, 12); the Assembly enacted laws governing the evaluation of requests
by  suppliants  (e.g.  Demosthenes,  XXIV,  51–52);  and  if  the  request  was  granted,  the
Assembly passed a decree ordering officials to carry out the terms of the request.102 The
polis did not create the religious practice of supplication and the beliefs associated with it;
the polis took a traditional practice (ta patria) and regulated it for public benefit. The polis
did  the  same  with  sacrifice,  pollution,  and  other  religious  practices.  Each  level  of
authority also did the same with these traditional practices. But that is the subject of
another essay.
47 Note: The published version of the essay is accompanied by four files containing a list of
all  the  documents  in  LSCG,  LSS,  LSAM and  NGSL  classified  according  to  the  typology
formulated in this essay. They are available at http://web.philo.ulg.ac.be/kernos/revue-
annuelle/kernos-28.
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NOTES
1. VON PROTT, ZIEHEN (1896–1906).
2. SOKOLOWSKI (1955), SOKOLOWSKI (1962), SOKOLOWSKI (1969). In this essay I will use the standard
abbreviations for these works.
3. LUPU (2005) and the second edition LUPU  (2009). Inscriptions in LUPU (2009) are cited as NGSL
with the number of the inscription.
4. For a critique of Lupu’s principles of selection see CARBON (2005).
5. LUPU (2009), p. 299–300 says that this document could be a sale of a priesthood.
6. In their discussions of sacred laws LUPU (2009), PARKER (2004), GEORGOUDI (2010), GAGARIN (2011)
and CARBON, PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2012) do not offer any analysis of the term “law.” Like Georgoudi, I
prefer to use the general term “regulations” and use the term “law” only in restricted cases.
7. LUPU (2009), p. 5–6. GAGARIN (2011), p. 101–102 follows Lupu without observing the problems
with this definition.
8. LUPU (2009), p. 9–112.
9. This section draws on HARRIS (2009/10),  p. 5–8 = HARRIS  (2013),  p. 138–140. LUPU  (2009),  p. 5
claims that “a formal definition of law (…) has little bearing upon the nature of the evidence…”
and then says that  the measures  he has collected are “for the most  part  of  a  tangibly  legal
character.” But how can Lupu determine which inscriptions have a “legal character” and which
ones do not without indicating what the term “legal” means and implies?
10. These features are based on the criteria of a legal anthropologist POSPISIL (1971) though I have
added “procedure” to his list.
11. For the Greek polis as a state see HANSEN (1998). For Athens in the Classical and Hellenistic
periods as a state see HARRIS (2013), p. 21–59. The use of the Greek term hieros nomos does occur
but is rare: see CARBON,  PIRENNE-DELFORGE (forthcoming). In the texts studied in this essay, the
Greeks tend to use the terms nomos and psephisma interchangeably. Between 403 and 322 BCE, the
Athenians  made  a  distinction  between  the  two  terms  (see  HANSEN [1978])  and  different
procedures for enacting the two kinds of measures (see CANEVARO [2013]), but these procedures
appear to have vanished by the third century BCE (see CANEVARO [2011]) and do not appear to
have been followed by other poleis. See RHODES, LEWIS (1997), p. 555. On the other hand, there is
some  evidence  that  the  Greeks  could  make  a  conceptual  distinction  between  permanent
measures (nomoi) and short-term ad hoc measures. For the relationship between the “unwritten
laws” and the laws of the polis see HARRIS (2006), p. 53–57.
12. Priests subject to euthynai at Athens: Aeschines, III, 18 with FRÖHLICH (2004), p. 331, 334, 337,
343, 352–353, 399, 403 n. 193. Although priests in other Greek communities were not subject to
euthynai, they were still accountable and could be punished for failure to carry out their duties.
See FRÖHLICH (2004), p. 107–108 (Magnesia on the Maeander), 177 (Orchomenus in Boeotia), 223
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(Ilium),  195,  256,  284  (Thasos),  261–262  (Halicarnassus),  314  (Mylasa),  425  (Lindos),  514
(Aphrodisias).
13. For cases about priesthoods and sacrifices see Lycurgus, On the Priestess, fr. 6 (ed. CONOMIS) and
Against Menesaichmus,  fr. 14 (ed. CONOMIS). For translation and brief commentary see HARRIS in
WORTHINGTON, COOPER, HARRIS (2001), p. 209–211, 216–217. LSCG no. 48, face B, l. 4 may allude to
this kind of trial.
14. PARKER (2004), p. 59 correctly sees that calendars qualify as “legislative enactments” but does
not understand how they could be enforced by legal punishments.
15. On the revision of Athenian laws between 410 and 399 see CANEVARO, HARRIS (2012), p. 110–116.
16. For the fragments of inscriptions attributed to these laws see LAMBERT (2002) and GAWLINSKI
(2007) with a new fragment. I myself have my doubts about attributing these fragments to the so-
called Lawcode of Nicomachus.
17. On penalties in sacred regulations see NAIDEN  (2008).  Limitations of space do not allow for a
discussion  of  the  interplay  between  punishment  by  human  authorities  (such  as  financial
penalties or exile) and punishment by gods (invoked through curses, the failure of sacrifices or
natural disasters resulting from pollution). On this topic see DELLI PIZZI (2011). On trials for asebeia
see FILONUK (2013).
18. On the casuistic form of a law see HARRIS (2013), p. 140.
19. In some cases, the official is allowed to impose a fine up to a certain amount, but must bring
an action in court if he wishes to impose a greater fine. See, for instance, LSCG no. 13, l. 27–30.
20. PARKER (2004), p. 62–65.
21. PARKER (2004),  p. 58 wonders “whether a particular veto has any more force than the ‘no
parking’ sign fastened by an individual to his garage door.” Actually, if someone parks a car in
someone else’s  driveway without  the latter’s  permission,  the owner can call  the police,  who
would have the car towed and impose a fine on the owner of the car. Experto credite.
22. Lucian, De sacrificiis, 13 appears to mention such a sign excluding those who do not have clean
hands from proceeding past the perirrhanteria and calls it a programma.  This kind of notice is
called a prographe at LSS no. 59, l. 9–10.
23. SOKOLOWSKI (1969), p. 241–242 notes the existence of “la série de petits règlements publics et
privés affichés devant les autels ou endroits où se pratiquait le culte,” but does not analyze this
category and how it differs from other publications of regulations about religious matters.
24. For the placement of decrees at Athens see LIDDEL (2003).
25. MA (2012), p. 133–143 makes a similar point.
26. Pace PARKER (2004).
27. PARKER (2004), p. 65 divides “sacred laws” into two categories, laws issuing from the assembly
with secular sanctions and conventions deriving from the exegetical tradition. As will become
obvious,  this  is  far  too  simplistic.  Parker  also  underestimates  the  enforceability  of  many
regulations.
28. See LSCG no. 78, l. 47–48.
29. For  the  shifting  membership  of  the  Amphictyony  see  LEFÈVRE  (1998),  p. 21–139.  Disputes
might  arise  among  the  members  about  how  the  Amphictyons  were  to  be  chosen.  For  one
example, see the dispute about the delegates from Euboea: CID IV, 124. For the meeting places see
LEFÈVRE (1998), p. 193–196.
30. SÁNCHEZ (1997) rightly questions Aeschines’ view that this version of the oath was formulated
when the Amphictyony was created in the Archaic period, but his quotation should contain parts
of the oath sworn in the middle of the fourth century BCE. Lefèvre accepts much of Sánchez’s
analysis but believes that parts could go back to the Archaic period. The oath at LSCG no. 78, l. 3–
9, appears to have pertained only to judicial matters. The oath mentioned by Aeschines (III, 107)
Toward a Typology of Greek Regulations about Religious Matters
Kernos, 28 | 2015
23
concerning  the  consecrated  land  at  Cirrha  was  probably  a  different  oath  but  bears  some
similarity to LSCG no. 78, l. 16–21.
31. For  the  enactment  formulas  see  LEFÈVRE (1998),  p. 209.  For  most  regulations  it  is  the
Amphictyons who enact legislation but see CID IV, 23 (hieromnemones).
32. SÁNCHEZ (2001), p. 510–516.
33. LSCG no. 78 = CID IV, 1 = IG II2, 1126 = Syll.3, 145.
34. For exclusion from the sanctuary by the Amphictyons see also Aeschines, III, 117, 122. For
sanctions imposed by the Amphictyons see SÁNCHEZ (2001), p. 483–485.
35. Cf. LEFÈVRE (1998), p. 268 who calls the Amphictyony “une association (ou organisation) dotée
d’institutions complexes, dont la nature internationale et l’autorité en matière d’administration
religieuse ont légitimé les compétences juridiques.”
36. For these grants of asylia see SÁNCHEZ (2001), p. 335–359.
37. For views about the historicity of the First Sacred War see  LEFÈVRE (1998), p. 14–15 (agnostic)
and SÁNCHEZ (2001), p. 67–73 (skeptical).
38. For discussion and references to other sources see SÁNCHEZ (2001), p. 203–213.
39. On sacred truces in general see ROUGEMONT (1973). On the Olympic truce see LÄMMER (1982/3).
40. The Spartans responded that  they had not  received the truce at  this  point  but  failed to
convince the people of Elis  who controlled Olympia (Thucydides,  V, 49,  2).  SOURVINOU-INWOOD
(1990), p. 297 sees this incident as evidence that even Panhellenic religion was subject to the polis,
but see the criticism of HORNBLOWER (2008), p. 125 (“it would be better to say that the Eleians had
a  double  or  conflicting  role,  as  competitive  polis and  as  administrators  of  a  Panhellenic
sanctuary”).
41. The laws mentioned in this inscription are norms of international life in ancient Greece and
are similar to the international norms about the treatment of heralds. On these see GIOVANNINI 
(2007).
42. For a list of oracles about the foundations of cities see FONTENROSE (1978), p. 439.
43. On divine sanction for the law of the polis see HARRIS (2006), p. 52–53.
44. A reference to the oracle at Delphi is restored in a fourth-century law about the first-fruits —
see LSS no. 13, l. 28–29. For other consultations of the oracle by the Athenians see BOWDEN (2005),
p. 168–169. See also BONNECHERE (2013) and BONNECHERE (2014).
45. Compare the way the Thracian orgeons of Bendis use the authority of the oracle at Dodona to
obtain privileges from the Assembly to establish a shrine and to lead a procession (LSCG no. 46,
l. 4–9. Cf. LSS no. 6, l. 15–17). There may be an allusion to an oracle of Apollo in LSS no. 8, l. 3–5
and LSS no. 12, l. 10.
46. For status of Ialysos as polis see NIELSEN, GABRIELSEN (2004), no. 995.
47. For prohibition of shoes see also LSCG no. 65, l. 15, 22–23; no. 68, l. 6–7; no. 124, l. 17 (also
animal-skin); LSAM no. 6, l. 3–4; no. 14, l. 11; LSS no. 59, l. 15.
48. PARKER (2004), p. 65–66 is perplexed by the two penalties, and claims that one is the legal
penalty but the phrase “subject to a charge of impiety” does not imply a legal penalty. This must
be wrong because the term ἔνοχος followed by the name of an offense invariably means “subject
to a legal charge” concerning the offense (see LSCG no. 158, l. 2; Demosthenes, XX, 96; XXII, 69;
XXIV, 61; LIV, 1; [Demosthenes] LIX, 125) or “subject to fines” (see LSCG no. 48, face A, l. 15–16; IG
X 2, 13, l. 17–18; Antiphon, IV, 1, 6; Lysias, XIV, 9). The term is also used in legal texts to mean
subject to curses (e.g. LSCG no. 118, l. 35–36; no. 158, l. 2–3 [restored]; Demosthenes, XXIII, 97).
There are two penalties for two different offenses. First, if one breaks any of the rules, one must
purify the sanctuary and perform a sacrifice. If one does not do this, one can be charged with
impiety. Second, for those who violate the rules by bringing in animals, there is an additional
financial penalty of one obol per animal.
49. This point is well made by CHANIOTIS (2009) but missed by PARKER (2004).
Toward a Typology of Greek Regulations about Religious Matters
Kernos, 28 | 2015
24
50. For the date of the foundation of Brea and its location see PSOMA (2009).
51. Sokolowski does this for some inscriptions, e.g. LSCG no. 80.
52. CARBON, PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2012) sensibly exclude such documents from their collection.
53. For the Eponymous Archon, the Polemarch and the Basileus having both religious and non-
religious functions see [Aristotle] Athenaion Politeia 56–58 with HARRIS (2006), p. 55.
54. On the role of pollution in homicide law see HARRIS (2015). For supplication and the law see
NAIDEN (2004) and NAIDEN (2006), p. 171–218.
55. On the features of laws during the Archaic period see HARRIS (2006), p. 14–25. PARKER (2004),
p. 58 correctly notes that laws about religious matters were enacted in the Assembly in exactly
the same way as laws about non-religious matters, but does not examine the other similarities
between  religious  and  non-religious laws.  LUPU (2009),  p. 3–112  comments  only  on  religious
matters and does not discuss legal aspects.
56. We find a similar rule in a law about the Eleusinian Mysteries. See CLINTON (2005), no. 138. For
an analysis of IG I3, 78 see HARRIS (2013), p. 163–164.
57. Despite its importance for the study of religious officials at Athens, this text is not included in
any of the four collections of “sacred laws.”
58. Amount of fines specified: LSCG no. 66, l. 9; no. 69, l. 10, 15–16; no. 116, l. 9–14; no. 166, l. 16–
20; LSS no. 38, face B, l. 10–15.
59. For the accountability of religious officials see note 12 above.
60. Fines for sacred officials who do not perform their duties:  LSCG no. 5,  l. 20–21; no. 65, l. 6
(refusal to swear an oath), 8–9 (refusal to swear an oath), 43–45, 51–52, 58–59, 62; no. 67, l. 4–5;
no. 70,  l. 48–52;  no. 83,  l. 28–30;  no. 91,  l. 2–6;  no. 93,  l. 29–30;  no. 101,  l. 5–7;  no. 115,  l. 8–10;
no. 122, l. 6–8; no. 144, face A, l. 6; no. 161, face A, l. 13–16; no. 173, l. 110–114; LSS no. 15, l. 40–42;
no. 24, l. 4–8; no. 121, l. 25–30; LSAM no. 69, l. 14–15; no. 70, l. 8–10; NGSL no. 17, l. 7–11.
61. RHODES (1972), p. 92–96, 127–134.
62. For entrenchment clauses see LSCG no. 65, l. 60–63 (several places); no. 150, face B, l. 8–12;
no. 156, face B, l. 26–29 (restored); LSAM no. 53, l. 23–33. For the role of entrenchment clauses see
HARRIS (2006), p. 23–25.
63. Methods  of  appointment  and  terms  of  office  for  religious  officials:  [Aristotle]  Athenaion
Politeia, 54, 6–7 (hieropoioi and Yearly Sacrificial Officers by lot); 57, 1 (epimeletai of the Mysteries
elected);  60,  1  (athlothetai selected by lot);  LSCG no. 12,  l. 2–7 (Athens;  by lot);  no. 13,  l. 19–20
(Athens; by lot); no. 58, l. 10–11 (Calaureia; election); no. 70, l. 12 (Oropos; election); no. 103, face
A, l. 10–11; face B, l. 14–15, 53–55 (Minoa on Amorgos; election); no. 122, l. 2–8 (Samos; election);
LSS no. 61, l. 41–44 (Aegiale; election). On the term epimenioi see CARBON, PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2013),
p. 87–94, esp. 93: “The epimenioi were certainly appointed on annual basis (kat’ eniauton), but their
function is hardly invoked for the duration of a whole year.” On the appointment of religious
officials at Athens see ALESHIRE (1994).
64. For boards of religious officials in the Greek polis see Aristotle, Politics VI, 1322b.
65. For boards of religious officials at Eleusis see CAVANAUGH (1996), p. xviii.
66. For boards of religious officials at Andania see GAWLINSKI (2012), p. 22–27.
67. E.g.,  napoiai at  Halasarna  (LSCG no. 173,  l. 32–34),  epimenioi at  Amorgos  and  Samos  ( LSCG
no. 103, l. 14–15, 20, 25, 58; no. 122, l. 2, 8).
68. LSCG no. 65,  l. 78–80;  no. 79,  l. 28–31;  no. 105;  no. 111,  l. 4–6;  no. 116  (penalty  for  not
reporting);  no. 136,  l. 33–35;  no. 148;  no. 166,  l. 27–34;  LSS no. 24,  l. 7–8,  11–12.  For  volunteer
prosecutors in the Greek polis see the preliminary remarks of RUBINSTEIN (2003), but the topic still
requires a thorough study.
69. On the deme calendars see WHITEHEAD  (1986),  p. 185–208. On the officials of the deme see
WHITEHEAD (1986), p. 121–148.
70. On leasing by the demes see WHITEHEAD (1986), p. 152–158.
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71. PARKER (2005), p. 64. PARKER (2005), p. 73 later qualifies this statement: “the demes were not in
fact independent republics.”
72. LSCG no. 37 concerns the sanctuary of  Apollo Erithasios  and grants  the power to impose
punishment on slaves and fines on free people to the priest and to the demarch, but was enacted
by the Council and Assembly (l. 12–13).
73. On  the  religious  activities  of  the  demes  of  Cos  see  PAUL  (2013),  p. 189–257.  On  tribal
organization see JONES (1987). Space does not allow a discussion of the religious practices of the
phylai.
74. For enactment formulas in private associations see, for instance, LSS no. 20, l. 2; IG XII 3, 330,
l. 126.  For  fines,  often collected by  officials,  see  LSCG no. 48,  face  A,  l. 9–11; no. 51,  l. 72–107;
no. 53, l. 43–45; no. 181, l. 11–13, 18–20; LSS no. 5, l. 5–9, 12–16, 25–27, 33–34, 43–44; LSAM no. 60,
face A, l. 1–12; face B, l. 1–12; no. 80, l. 11–22; IG XII 3, 330, l. 142–146, 161–164, 169–177, 215–221,
229–241,  261–267.  PARKER  (2004),  p. 61  briefly  discusses  sub-divisions  of  the  polis and  private
associations without analyzing the different legal justifications for their regulations.
75. On the enforcement of the law at Athens see HARRIS (2013), p. 21–59.
76. On the contract of koinonia see HARRIS (2006), p. 241–247. On the absence of juristic personality
for private religious associations in ancient Greece see USTINOVA (2005) and ISMARD (2007). The
situation in Roman Law was similar: see COTTER (1996), p. 75: “A private guild was never awarded
the status of a ‘juristic person’.”
77. For  the  debate  about  the  authenticity  of  Solon’s  law  see  ARNAOUTOGLOU (2003),  p. 44–57
(inauthentic) and ISMARD (2010), p. 44–57 (authentic).
78. Even though there were different types of private religious associations (gene, orgeones, thiasoi
, etc.), they were similar from a legal point of view insofar as their relations were regulated by
contract.
79. For exclusion from associations see, for example, LSCG no. 51, l. 48–49, 104–106.
80. For criticism of the term see MODRZEJEWSKI (1963), who does not however offer a substitute.
The term is still  used by LUPU (2009) and by HARTER-UIBOPUU  (2011),  p. 125, 131, who uses the
anachronistic  term  “deed  of  foundation”.  CARBON,  PIRENNE-DELFORGE  (2013)  prefer  to  speak  of
family dossiers.
81. This definition is quoted with approval by JONES  (1983), who uncritically applies the term
“foundations”  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  world.  Jones  appears  to  have  been  unaware  of
Modrzejewski’s objections to this term.
82. For similar phrases in wills see IG XII 3, 330, l. 6–7 (this part of the will of Epikteta is not
included in LSCG no. 135); Diogenes Laertius, V, 11 (ἐὰν δέ τι συμβαίνῃ), 51 (ἐὰν δέ τι συμβαίνῃ).
For a similar euphemism for death see Demosthenes, XX, 159 (ἄν τις […] τι πάθῃ).
83. HARTER-UIBOPUU (2011), p. 121–122 does not see that the donation comes from the terms of a
will.
84. IG XII 3, 330, l. 107–108. On the duties imposed on freedmen see CANEVARO, LEWIS (2014). 
85. HARTER-UIBOPUU (2011), p. 121–122 makes no comment on this key phrase.
86. On similar laws about dedications see SOSIN (2005).
87. HARTER-UIBOPUU (2011),  p. 120–121  draws  a  similar  contrast  between  what  she  calls
foundations and epidoseis.
88. Even  though  the  transaction  resembles  a  contract  in  the  sense  that  it  is  bilateral,  the
acceptance of the donation by the polis takes the form of a decree. The language of contract (
synthekai, etc.) never occurs in these documents (pace MANNZMANN [1962]). Once the polis accepts
the donation, it acts unilaterally and imposes duties on its officials. In a contract, by contrast,
either one party makes a promise to another or both parties make promises to each other, but in
these donations, the city simply accepts the donation and the terms and enacts rules to ensure
that the donation is used for a certain purpose. There is no exchange of promises.
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89. The dedication made by Agasigratis, the daughter of Teisias, (LSCG no. 58) may be similar to
that of Alcesippus if the epimeletai mentioned in l. 10–11 are public officials and Poseidon is the
god of the Calaurian Amphictyony.
90. LSCG no. 58 probably pertains to a similar kind of arrangement even though the enactment
formula is missing.
91. SOKOLOWSKI in LSCG no. 80, reproduces only l. 44–63, which is misleading because it does not
allow one to understand the legal status of the sacred regulations.
92. On these clauses see SICKINGER (2008).
93. For  a  donation  that  gave  rise  to  an  equally  elaborate  set  of  rules  see  the  donation  of
Aristomenes to the city of Corcyra to hire artists of Dionysus (IJG XXV.B). The donor gives sixty
mnai (l. 2–5, 39–42) and the Council enacts numerous measures to lend the money and spend it on
the artists (l. 42–146). In this case, however, if the money is not spent in the correct way, it is to
be returned to the donor or to his descendants (l. 29–37).
94. LUPU  (2009),  p. 81–87  notes  the  difference  between  “public  foundations”  and  “private
foundations” but does not analyze the legal aspects of the two transactions.
95. Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge per litteras inform me that “the priestess’ name has been erased
and left as an empty rasura.”
96. For this inscription I follow the text of Carbon in CARBON, PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2013).
97. The testator pledges the property to his descendants as security for the promise of the eldest
son to hand over four golden pieces every year for the rituals. Presumably, if the eldest son did
not make this payment, the association could then seize the properties pledged as security and
use them to pay for the prescribed rituals.
98. On the tendency not to define key terms in laws about religious activities see HENRICHS (2003).
One must not make the mistake of thinking that because Greek laws sometimes do not define
substantive  terms,  these  terms  were  not  important,  could  not  give  clear  guidance  or  were
infinitely elastic. See HARRIS (2013), p. 175–182.
99. This  fact  undermines  the  view  of  SOURVINOU-INWOOD (1990)  that  “The  polis  anchored,
legitimated and mediated all religious activity.” For some criticisms of the polis religion approach
see KINDT (2012).
100. For the legal issues in the Antigone see HARRIS (2006), p. 41–80.
101. On the unwritten laws of the gods see HARRIS (2006), p. 51–58. 
102. On supplication and the law see NAIDEN (2004).
ABSTRACTS
The collections of “sacred laws” made by Sokolowski and Lupu are valuable resources for the
study of Greek religion but do not classify the different types of documents by legal criteria. This
essay proposes to classify the documents in these collections according to the legal authorities
that enacted them: federal bodies in charge of international shrines, city-states, sub-divisions of
the polis (demes,  tribes),  private associations (phratries,  gene,  orgeones,  etc.)  and donations to
public authorities and private groups. It also draws attention to the different means of enforcing
Greek norms about religious practices. Finally, it discusses the meaning of the phrase ta patria
and its relationship to the different levels of religious authority.
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Les  recueils  des  « lois  sacrées »  effectué  par  Sokolowski  et  Lupu  sont  incontestablement  un
instrument  de  travail  de  premier  rang  pour  l’étude  de  la  religion  grecque.  Pourtant,  les
documents dans ces recueils ne sont pas classés sur des critères juridiques. La présente étude vise
à proposer une classification de documents en question conformément aux autorités qui les ont
émis :  conseils fédéraux en charge de sanctuaires panhelléniques, cités, subdivisions du corps
civique  (dèmes,  tribus),  associations  privées  (phratries,  génè,  orgéônes)  et  donations  à  des
autorités publiques ou à des associations privées. Il s’intéresse également aux différents moyens
de faire respecter les normes concernant les pratiques religieuses, et analyse la signification de
l’expression ta patria et sa relation avec les différents niveaux d’autorité religieuse.
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